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Abstract
Despite a series of official agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund coopera-
tion, it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls
short of what should be rationally expected. A greater pressure for conformity, required
by the need of coordination, may contrast with the objective of enhancing policy adap-
tation to the specific conditions revealed by each institution’s specialized expertise. In
this paper we present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of information
transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyzes the impact of different governance
structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation. We compare the performance of
a “delegation-scheme” with that of a “centralization-scheme.” A centralized structure
better addresses the necessity of coordinating policy actions but greater consistency
between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a
less satisfactory adaptation to “local conditions.” When the need for coordination is
relevant, as it is generally the case for the Bank and the Fund operations, we find that
a centralized governance structure allows to achieve a level of overall payoff greater
than those of a decentralized one.
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1 Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were originally created
as two distinct and independent institutions with complementary tasks and different methods
of intervention, within the framework of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944). Over the
years, however, their mandates have expanded in response to the changing realities of the
global economy and the degree of overlap between the two has increased, leading to more
room for both conflict and cooperation.
Despite a series of official agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation,
it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of
what should be rationally expected. However, little theoretical and empirical analyses exist
about what factors inhibit or encourage cooperation between the IMF and the WB. In this
paper we try to fill this gap by presenting a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality
of information transmission between the two institutions, analyzes the impact of different
governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation.
Many public documents and reports have stressed that more cooperation and coordina-
tion between the Bank and the Fund is crucial to exploit potential synergies and to avoid
potential sources of conflicts which could jeopardize the success of their adjustment programs.
The degree of coordination depends critically on the degree of communication between the
two organizations. In the past, the Bank and the Fund used to adhere to certain recipes
for reforms (the so called Washington Consensus), and have prescribed many conditions of
their policy lending accordingly. However, as Birdsall and Kapur (2005) have emphasized,
the notion of an agreed set of policy recommendations no longer exists and as the reform
agenda has deepened to include institutional and social reforms it has become apparent that
a “top-down” approach does not produce sustained reforms.
The current trend, on the contrary, puts a greater emphasis on incorporating country-
specific inputs (the so called “local knowledge”) and on promoting country ownership in
the formulation of policy proposals, which in turn requires greater engagement of borrowing
governments. Indeed, as emphasized by Dixit (2009), Easterly (2006, 2008), Rajan (2008)
and Marchesi et al. (2011), institutions, organizations, and policies are context-specific and
thus International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been urged to base their recommended
policy changes (conditions) on a good understanding of the structure and properties of the
recipient country’s institutional, political and economic context.1
Although local knowledge is vital to the definition of economic problems and their prac-
1For example, according to Woods (2006), sustained reforms require a deeper commitment or support
from the broader political system and society.
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ticable solutions, it is well known that it political intractable, and very difficult to make
judgments about (Wood, 2006). In other words, local knowledge often consists of unverifi-
able information (or verifiable only at a cost). Such a shift from a well defined framework
to guide conditions for policy lending, substantially based on “hard information,” towards a
situation where conditions more and more are related to “soft” information has important
implications for the interaction and future cooperation between the Bank and the Fund.
Indeed, we can expect that, whenever the objectives of the two institutions are not com-
pletely aligned, the information transmitted will be distorted, since both institutions will
use communication strategically to influence decision making to their favour.
The misalignment of interests between the Bank and the Fund arises when decision mak-
ing involves a trade off between coordination and adaptation to “local conditions.”2 Although
the extent of overlap between the operations of the two organizations have incraesed over
time, they still maintain a strongly specialized expertise in their core areas of intervention:
monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies for the Fund and policy areas related to develop-
ment for the Bank. Therefore, each institution bases its decision on specialized information
that is only partially overlapping. A greater pressure for conformity, required by the need of
coordination, may contrast with the objective of enhancing policy adaptation to the specific
conditions revealed by each institution’s specialized expertise.3
In our paper we compare two types of organizational structure: centralization vs decen-
tralization. We define as “centralized” an organization in which control rights over policies
are allocated to an “headquarter” which decides policy recommendations after receiving the
Fund and the Bank suggestions relative to their respective core area of intervention (vertical
communication). On the contrary, with “decentralization” we refer to the existing organi-
zational structure, in which control rights are retained by the two institutions (in each own
sphere of influence), and the coordination between the two is left to the discretion of their
executive boards (horizontal communication).
The headquarter maximizes overall “payoffs” (given by the sum of the Bank and the
Fund objective functions), while under “decentralization” each executive board maximizes
its own objective function. Contrary to the headquarter, the executive board of each institu-
2The increasing emphasis in policy lending on country specificity and ownership now implies that not
only should the Bank and Fund cooperate more but they should also deliver the policy advice that suits
best borrowing governments. On that respect, the Bank seems to have adapted better and faster to such
requirements through an more decentralized and flexible operational model than the Fund.
3Fabricious (2007) empirically shows that whenever the Bank and the Fund agree on the boundaries of
each other’s operations (the so called “domain consensus”), they tend to speak with one voice. However, the
increasing overlap of the mandates of the two organizations over time has amplified the areas of potential
conflict, since each institutions tends to exaggerate the importance of their own opinions overlooking the
importance of compromise.
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tion does not fully internalize the benefits of coordination, since it does not internalize how
its actions affect the other institution. Therefore, a centralized structure better addresses
the necessity of coordinating policy actions. This intuition, however, overlooks the fact that
the headquarter is uninformed and must rely on the specialized information transmitted by
the Bank and the Fund to take decisions. Differently from a decentralized structure, where
communication is crucial to improve coordination, in a centralized structure communication
is fundamental to improve adaptation. But the misalignment of interests between the head-
quarter and the single institutions prevents vertical communication to be truthful. Thus,
adaptation losses are always higher in a centralized governance than in a decentralized one.
On the other hand, the decisions taken by the headquarter are not biased by the selfishness
of the two institutions, as it happens instead in a decentralized structure. Therefore, the
coordination losses are always lower.4 Consequently, in a centralized governance, a greater
consistency between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of
a less satisfactory adaptation to “local conditions.” However, when the need for coordination
is relevant, as it is generally the case for the Bank and the Fund operations, given their strong
complementariness, we find that a centralized governance allows to achieve a level of overall
payoffs greater than those of a decentralized one.5
This result is in line with the empirical results by Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) who,
estimating the impact on economic growth of the simultaneous participation in both IMF
and WB programs, find that such interaction between these two organizations has a positive
and significant impact on growth. This result is also in line with the general wisdom that
centralization must be preferred when the need for coordination is relevant, and it supports
the reform proposals which have favorably looked at a possible merger between the two
institutions.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some institutional information
regarding the overlapping responsibilities of the IMF and the WB while Section 3 briefly
describes the related literature. Section 4 presents the theoretical model and finally Section
5 concludes.
4This happens because the conflict of interest between the two institutions is always greater than the
conflict of interest between each institution and the headquarter.
5As Krueger (1997) puts it: “a strong case can be made that the functions of lending policy advice training
research and provision of information of both the Bank and the Fund are mutually complementary and that
the spillovers from each of the functions to the others are large.”
6See for example, Clark (1990); Crook (1991); Shultz (1998); Burnham (1999) and Fischer (2004).
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2 IMF and the World Bank: synergies and conflict
The World Bank and the IMF were created as two distinct and independent institutions with
different tasks and methods of intervention, within the framework of the Bretton Woods
agreement (1944). Up to the 1980s, the division of labor between the Fund and the Bank
had been relatively straightforward. While the Fund’s orientation was towards short-run
macroeconomic stability, the Bank was oriented towards long-run development programs.
At the same time the existence of synergies between the two institutions has also been
recognized. Such synergies, however, became become more important during the 70’s and the
80’s when, on the one hand, the IMF started to complement demand management policies
by supply side policies and, on the other, the World Bank changed its policy towards a
more explicit recognition of the importance of macroeconomic policies besides the traditional
project and sector lending.7 Moreover, during the 1980s, the Fund’s lending became more
concessional and related to structural matters and increasingly focused on lower income
countries, those typically “served” by the Bank.
The first step toward a formal recognition of the importance of cooperation between the
IMF and the World Bank was already made in 1966 with an agreement which explicitly
laid out the primary responsibilities of each organizations and the procedures for the two
to work together (Boughton, 2001).8 Then, in 1974, the Development Committee (DC)
was established, it is a joint ministerial committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank
and the Fund in charge of advising both institutions on critical development issues and on
the financial resources required to promote economic growth in developing countries. The
Committee should assure high-level coordination and facilitate intergovernmental consensus-
building on development issues.
Lately, in 1989, a Concordat was signed by the IMF and the World Bank in which a vast
area of overlapping responsibilities was explicitly identified. In this common area, cooper-
ation should have been pursued and strengthened: to this scope the Concordat did define
guidelines and terms of the World Bank-Fund interaction, and the mechanisms for resolving
potential conflicts between the sister organizations. Both institutions committed themselves
to systematically exchange information concerning low and middle-income countries. More-
7Between 1980 and 1984 energy prices were addressed in 46% of Fund supported programs, the mobiliza-
tion of domestic savings in 54% investment planning and execution in 37%. These were areas of primary
responsibility of the Bank. Similarly the Bank was increasingly concerned with many variables central to
Fund stabilization program (Feinberg, 1988)
8According to the Dual memoranda of December 1966, the need for collaboration is made explicit by giving
numerous examples of overlapping responsibilities: the structure and functioning of financial institutions,
the adequacy of money and capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of a country to generate
domestic savings, the implications of development programs for the internal and external financial position
of a country (Gold,1982).
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over, the Concordat encouraged them to exchange this information not only within their
decision bodies, but also at the level of the operative staff. We should emphasize that the
Concordat was motivated by the public nature of the disagreement between the Fund and
the Bank about Argentina, in 1988. At that time, the rules on collaboration broke down
when the World Bank announced a new loan to the country, before the IMF mission had
completed its negotiations with the Argentinian authorities. This circumstance forced the
two organizations to come up with a new agreement to guide collaboration (Wood, 2006).
Later on, in 1988, during the Asian Crisis, a new episode of disagreement promoted
the issuing of a joint statement by the Bank president and the Fund managing director on
Bank-Fund collaboration. In light of the greater overlap in operations, the leaders of the two
organizations reaffirmed that a better collaboration was needed.
Despite all these official documents aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, op-
erations in middle-income countries are not yet guided by any formal collaborative vehicle.
As a result, the Bank and the Fund cooperation hinges critically on discretional communi-
cation at the staff level. The case is different for low income countries. With the creation of
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF), later substituted by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), struc-
tural adjustment has served to create an important area of overlap between the Bank and
the Fund.9 To access this program the country has to elaborate a policy framework paper,
that is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPs), jointly with the staff of the Fund
and the Bank. The process of drafting the PRSPs was designed to ensure the consistency
of the Bank’s and the Fund’s stances, by forcing them to develop a common view on the
appropriate policy advice for the country.10
Despite good intentions PRSPs revealed some weaknesses such as the asymmetry in the
documents’ operational importance in each organization, the lack of specificity in outlining
policy targets, and the failure to effectively engage the borrowing government in the process.
Most notably, this latter weakness with the PFP process underscored the need for more
substantial country involvement and pushed the Bank and the Fund to acknowledge country
ownership as an emerging priority of development cooperation. By many standards, country
ownership had come to be considered an important component of successful poverty reduction
9In January 2010, three types of loans were created under the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust
(PRGT) as part of a broader reform: the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)
and the Standby Credit Facility (SCF). In particular, the ECF succeeds the PRGF as the Fund’s main tool
for providing medium-term support.
10In the same year, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was enhanced as a direct
outcome of a comprehensive review carried out by the International Development Association (IDA) and the
IMF. The initiative entails a coordinated commitment to reduce and forgive large volumes of debt to the
poorest and most indebted countries.
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and development (IMF and World Bank 2001).11
More recently, in 2007 the World Bank and the Fund signed a Joint Management Ac-
tion Plan, which sets concrete steps to improve the culture of cooperation between the two
institutions, emphasizing, on the one hand, that duplicate functions represent a waste of
resources for both institutions and, on the other, that uncoordinated policy prescriptions
can make it harder for recipients dealing with adjustment programs. The Plan calls for
an improvement of coordination and communication and it also recommends to translate
identified good-practices concerning interaction into standard practices.
The issue of Fund Bank coordination is still debated nowadays and far form being settled.
For example, the forthcoming IMF review of conditionality is expected to contain a fair
amount of discussion of coordination with the World Bank. This is going to be crucial
especially for middle income countries whose operations are not guided by any formal process,
like the PRSP or the related facilities in the two organizations.
3 Related literature
This paper is related to three strands of literature. The first is the literature on strategic
information transmission, which is built on the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982),
hereafter CS. More specifically, we are related to the literature on coordination in organiza-
tions under distributed information (Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008, hereafter ADM;
Rantakari, 2008). These authors address the problem of an organization in which two op-
erating divisions (managers) should adapt to local conditions but also coordinate with each
other. Coordination must rely on communication, since managers are privately informed
about their local conditions. The need to balance conflicting needs for adaptation creates
conflicting preferences and, as result, communication will be distorted since both divisions
will try to influence decision making to their favour, using communication strategically. Un-
der this framework two different governance structure are analyzed: a centralized and a
decentralized one. The results of ADM and Rantakari confirm the general wisdom that
when coordination needs are relevant, a centralized structure in which decision rights are
allocated to an headquarter, should be preferred, although adaptation to local conditions
will be always less satisfactory than in a decentralized structure.
The second stream of literature which we relate to is primarily concerned with the gov-
ernance of the IFIs. While there are many papers dealing with both the IMF and the WB
individually, to our knowledge, there are very few papers analyzing what governance struc-
11For example, in its review of program performance, the Funds Policy Development and Review Depart-
ment (PDR) found that a substantial proportion of program interruptions had been attributable to policy
disagreements between governments and the Fund staff (IMF 1998).
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ture may inhibit or encourage cooperation between the IMF and the WB. More specifically,
there is no contribution addressing this problem theoretically.12 Fabricius (2007), drawing
on field research conducted in Ghana, Pakistan, Peru, and Vietnam, over the period 1980-
96, has tried to identify empirically the conditions that determine whether or not these
organizations are actually collaborating, addressing as well whether such collaboration is
necessarily a good thing. According to Fabricius’ results, Bank-Fund cooperation (or con-
sistency) depends critically on the level of communication between the two organizations,
where such exchange of information is not generally institutionalized but it has been let to
the discretion of individuals (i.e., the staff members).13 Whether or not the Bank and the
Fund cooperate has been found to depend on two conditions, which are highly correlated.
Namely, similarity in the Bank’s and the Fund’s organizational structures (which facilitates
communication) and the so called “domain consensus” (i.e. the degree to which they consent
to the domain of their respective activities in the division of labor).14 Finally, an impor-
tant implication emerging from this study is that Bank-Fund consistency may not always be
desirable. According to Fabricious, pressures for conformity might jeopardize “ownership”
of lending conditions and thus he suggests that the Bank and the Fund should pursue a
case-specific approach in deciding whether or not to coordinate.
A similar problem is also addresses by Hagen (2010), who asks how “ownership” could
be affected by introducing more or less donors’ coordination. Indeed in the case of multiple
(uncoordinated) donors greater coordination (especially in the case of a “lead lender” and of
a silent partner) could generate some pressure for conformity, which may contrast with the
objective of enhancing recipients’ ownership.
In both papers a trade off between responding to local conditions (i.e., improving “own-
ership”) and coordination among donors, clearly emerges. However, the problem of what
governance structure may better respond to such trade off is not addressed. In this paper
we propose to fill the gap by applying the analysis of ADM and Rantakari (2008) to analyse
the impact of different governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation.
The third and final strand of literature we look at is empirical. Despite a vast literature
considering the individual impact of the IMF and the WB on recipient countries’ economic
12Some political scientists have addressed the issue of the efficiency of the separation between the Fund
and the Bank, arguing that these two global economic institutions, created for very different purposes,
are nowadays indistinguishable for all intents and purposes,and their artificial separation is inefficient (e.g.,
Clark, 1990; Crook, 1991; Shultz, 1998; Burnham, 1999 and Fischer, 2004).
13The main exception being the PRSPs which are prepared by the countries themselves together with the
World Bank and the IMF. However, this only applies to low-income countries.
14Moreover, the evidence collected at the country level suggests that the most difficult factor that Bank and
Fund staff must overcome to ensure domain consensus is the difference between the two organizations’ opera-
tional styles (the Fund remains a highly centralized organization while the Bank has gradually decentralized
its operations to the borrowing countries).
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growth and development, little is known about the effects of the simultaneous presence
of both institutions in a single country. Moreover, little empirical evidence exists about
how and under what circumstances these two organizations work actually together. It is
therefore difficult to distinguish the effect of their interaction from that of their simultaneous
action, which may in itself have an effect. Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) have estimated the
impact on economic growth of the joint participation in both IMF and WB programs. As
a proxy of Bank-Fund interaction they used the simultaneous presence of a Bank and Fund
program in the same country and at the same time.15 More specifically, using panel data
for 128 developing countries over the period 1982-2005, and employing 2SLS to control for
the possible endogeneity of participation in an IMF/WB program, Marchesi and Sirtori find
that the interaction between these two organizations has a positive and significant impact
on growth. More specifically, the coefficient of IMF programs is negative and significant, the
coefficient of World Bank programs is not significant while the coefficient of their interaction
term is positive and significant at conventional levels. The results suggest that the WB can
have a stronger impact on growth when the IMF is simultaneously involved as compared to
when it is acting individually.
4 The model
Over the years the evolution of the Fund and the Bank has generated an expansion of their
respective “areas of expertise,” which does require a stronger coordination between their
actions in order to exploit all their potential synergies. At the same time, the increasing
importance of “local knowledge” in designing sustainable reforms and the greater overlap be-
tween their “areas of action,” has also brought about an increase in competition between the
two institutions. More competition tend to make each institutions overlook the importance
of compromise.16 As a consequence, the need to balance conflicting needs for adaptation
creates conflicting preferences in many areas of intervention and, in taking their decisions,
both the Fund and the Bank must now balance the benefits of setting their actions closer
either to those of the other decision maker (coordination) or to their idiosyncratic “state of
nature” (adaptation).
15Being involved simultaneously with the same country does not necessarily mean that these two organi-
zations are actually working together. The Bank and Fund could lend simultaneously to the same country
without any exchange of information as well as exchanging information also at a distance. However, ceteris
paribus, it is plausible to believe that these institutions will be more likely to interact when simultaneously
“involved” with the same country as compared to the case in which they are acting on their own.
16This may depend on either the lack of domain consensus, making both the Fund and the Bank exag-
gerate the importance of their opinion on the issue at the stake, or to the growing importance that “local
conditions”-as revealed by each institution’s specialized information- have been acquiring in tailoring adjust-
ment programs to recipients’ needs.
9
This general problem has been formally modelled by ADM by referring to an organization
with two distinct divisions. In the following we refer to a simplified version of their model.
More specifically, differently from them, we assume that the two divisions (the Fund and the
Bank in our context) are fully selfish.17 We believe that this scenario better describes a situ-
ation in which the public evaluation of the two institutions’ operations responds exclusively
to their own performance. The notation we use follows ADM.
4.1 Objective functions
The trade off between coordination and adaptation can be formalized by assuming that the
Fund and the Bank have to minimize the following quadratic loss functions, respectively:
 = (1 − 1)2 +  (1 − 2)2 (1)
 = (2 − 2)2 +  (2 − 1)2 (2)
where 1 represents the Fund’s decision, 2 represent the Bank’s decision and  ∈ 
 ∈ {1 2}  represents the “specialized information” of each institutions. The Fund observes
its “local conditions” 1 without knowing the Bank’s “local conditions” (i.e., the realization
of 2 ) and viceversa. It is common knowledge that 1 and 2 are uniformly distributed on£− ¤  and the draws of 1 and 2 are independent. The first term of the loss function
represents the loss due to a not satisfactory adaptation to local conditions, that is  6= ,
while the second term represents the coordination loss that the Fund (and the Bank) incurs
when their actions are not perfectly coordinated, that is 1 6= 2.
The parameter  ∈ [0∞)measures the relative weight of coordination losses with respect
to adaptation losses. If the degree of competition between these two institutions is high, 
will be low, namely the two institutions overlook the need to coordinate their action in order
to improve the adaptation to “local conditions.” On the contrary, if the gain from exploiting
synergies is high,  will be high. The degree of the “environmental volatility” which is faced
by the IMF is given by the variance of 1 (i.e., 21) while that of the Bank is given bythe
variance of 2 (i.e., 22).
4.2 Delegation versus centralization
Under a decentralized governance structure, control rights over 1 and 2 are allocated to the
IMF and the WB, respectively. Each of them will take decisions to minimize its own loss
17The selfishness of the two institutions might be explained by the circumstance that the career of both
the Fund and the Bank staff members depend on skills and efforts which are exclusively related to the
performance of each institution.
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function, overlooking the effect which its own action has on the other institution. Thus, we
assume that the Fund and the Bank first observe their local conditions, then they send each
other messages 1 and 2 about the realization of their own state of nature, and finally
they take their decisions to minimize respectively  £ | 12¤ and  £ | 21¤ 
Under a centralized governance structure, control rights over 1 and 2 are retained by a
central authority, the Headquarter (HQ), that is not informed about the “local conditions”.
The HQ acts in behalf of global taxpayers and therefore takes decisions 1 and 2 to minimize
the following loss function:
 =  +  (3)
Before taking decisions the HQ receives messages1 and2 about the realization of the
two states on nature from the Fund and the Bank, respectively, and then it takes decisions
1 and 2 to minimize  £ | 12¤ 
4.3 Decision making
We analyze decision making by assuming both a centralized and a decentralized governance
structure.
Under centralization, the HQ receives messages by the Fund and the Bank and then
chooses (1 2) to minimize ( |  = (12))Taking the first order conditions of the
expected value of (3) with respect to 1 and 2 and solving for the equilibrium decisions, it
is possible to show that:
1 = (1 | ) + (1− )(2 | ) (4)
2 = (1− )(1 | ) + (2 | ) (5)
where:
 = 1 + 2
1 + 4 (1)
The equilibrium decisions are convex combination of the HQ’s posterior beliefs about the
states of the fundamentals 1 and 2 conditional on the vector  When the importance of
coordination increases and eventually when  −→∞ the HQ sets:
1 = 2 = 12 [(1 | ) +(2 | )] 
Under decentralization, taking the first order conditions of the expected value of (1)
and (2) with respect to 1 and 2, deriving the reaction functions and solving them for the
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equilibrium decisions, yields:
1 = 1 + (1− )((1 | 2) + (1− )(2 | 1)) (6)
and:
2 = 2 + (1− )((2 | 1) + (1− )(1 | 2)) (7)
where  = 1
1+ and  = 1+2 
The Fund decision is a convex combination of 1 and its posterior beliefs about 2 (i.e.,
(2 | 1))and the Bank posterior belief about 1 (i.e., (1 | 2))
Similarly, the Bank decision is a convex combination of 2 and its posterior beliefs about
1 (i.e., (1 | 2)) and the Fund posterior belief about 2 (i.e., (2 | 1)) As
 → ∞ for given posterior beliefs, the decentralized decisions converge to that of the HQ,
that is:
1 = 2 = 12 [(1 | ) +(2 | )]  (8)
in other words, as the need of coordination increases, the misalignment between the objectives
of the HQ and those of both the Fund and the Bank disappears.
4.4 Strategic Communication
To improve coordination between their own specialized decisions, the Fund and the Bank can
communicate the realization of their observed state of nature before taking action. However,
the non-verifiability of information (i.e., soft information) creates communication problems.
Under both organizational structures the information transmitted will never be truthful:
indeed, there will always be an incentive for either the Fund or the Bank to exaggerate the
realization of the state of nature with a positive bias if   0 and with a negative bias if
  0 with  = 1 2.18
Let us consider first the case of a decentralized structure. Let us suppose that the Fund
sends message 1 to the Bank The Bank’s expected response to message 1 is given by
(1 − )(1 − )(1 | 2) with (1 − )(1 − )  1. In this case, the Fund, anticipating
Bank’s behavior, will try to induce a higher “reaction” by the Bank, by exaggerating the
value of the report about the realized 1 which makes full communication impossible. It is
straightforward to show that only when 1 = 0 communication will be truthful. The same
argument applies to the Bank.
The incentives to misrepresent information exists also in a centralized governance struc-
18This is the typical setting of a cheap talk models where agency problems prevents communication from
being sincere (CS). Each agent introduces a distortion in its message in order to manipulate the choice of
the other.
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ture. Indeed, the HQ puts more weight on minimizing the coordination losses than the Fund
or the Bank would like it to do. If for example the Fund truthfully communicate 1 6= 0 to the
HQ, it would expects that the latter would take decision 1 = (1 | ) which, from its
point of view, would not be “extreme” enough, given that (2) = 0 and   +(1−) As
a consequence, the Fund will exaggerate the realization of 1 by reporting1  1 (if 1  0)
or 1  1 (if 1  0) It is straightforward to show that only when 1 = 0 communication
will be truthful. The same argument applies to the Bank.
The incentives to mis-report information are qualitatively the same in both governance
structure, but it is possible to show that as the need for coordination increases (that is
as  increases) the quality of information (horizontal communication) transmitted under a
decentralized governance structure increases, while it worsens in a centralized governance
structure (vertical communication). Intuitively, in a decentralized structure an increase in
the need of coordination makes both agents more responsive to the communicated informa-
tion, since they put less weight on adapting decisions to their own “local conditions.” This
circumstance reduces the incentives to exaggerate information. In contrast, in a centralized
structure, as the need for coordination increases, the HQ becomes less and less responsive to
communicated information. This explains why the Fund’s (or Bank’s) incentive to exaggerate
information increases.
Moreover, when  = 0 the need to balance conflicting needs for adaptation disappears in
both types of governance structure. In the case of centralization, vertical communication will
be fully truthful, that is:  =  1 = 1 and 2 = 2; while in the case of decentralization,
communication becomes totally uninfluential, since both institutions will only put weight on
the adaptation to their respective local conditions, namely: 1 = 1 and 2 = 2 Therefore,
the two governance structure will produce the same results.
Finally, as  → ∞ for given posterior beliefs, the decentralized decisions converge to
that of the HQ, as in equation (8) above.
4.5 Communication Equilibria
We model the coordination game of an organization with two divisions where decisions
must both be adapted to local conditions and coordinated with each other. Information
about local conditions is private, soft and communicated by cheap talk. ADM show that all
communication equilibria are interval equilibria in which the state space,
£− ¤,  = 1 2,
are partitioned in intervals, and each division reveals only which interval its local conditions
 belong to.19 The equilibrium concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE
19The contribution of Alonso et al is an extension of the famous Crawford and Sobel (1982 contribution
on cheap talk games.Crawford and Sobel focus on the amount of information that will be communicated by
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equilibrium consists of a reporting strategy 1(1 | 1) for the Fund and a reporting strategy
2(2 | 2) for the Bank, given a probability distribution over reports  conditional on the
value of  observed, and a posterior belief functions ( | ) satisfying (|)Z

(|)
for
 = 1 2, given the posterior probability of  conditional on each possible report .
The decision rule, under decentralization, is given by the functions 1 (12) 2 (12)
reported in (4) and (5)); while, under decentralization, the decision rule is given by the
functions 1 (12) 2 (12) reported in (6) and (7)).
For an interval equilibrium to be incentive compatible, it is necessary that ,when the
realized state falls on the boundary of two intervals of the partition, the sender must be
indifferent between saying that the state belongs to either one of the intervals. This condition
translates in a differential equation whose solution defines the family of incentive-compatible
partitions:20
+1 −  =  − −1 + 4 (9)
−(+1)− − = − − −(−1) + 4− (10)
for  = 1 2 − 1 , where  is the number of intervals.
Conditions (9) and (10) say that the size of the interval (+1−) is equal to the size of
the preceding interval ( − −1) plus 4; symmetrically, in the negative semiaxis, the
size of the interval (−(+1)− −) is equal to that of the preceding interval plus 4−
It is possible to show that  =  = 1+ under centralization and  =  = 1+ under
decentralization : this means that the quality of communication deteriorates as  moves
further away from its mean value, that is  = 0. This result is intuitive since the incentives
to misrepresent information increase with the module of 
Furthermore, we can see that  increases with  while  decreases with  Consistently
with what intuitively explained in the previous subsection, this means that in a centralized
governance, communication becomes noisier when the need of coordination (i.e., ) increases,
while in a decentralized governance, communication becomes more precise. However, it is
possible to check that  ≤  ∀ : this implies that in a centralized structure the quality of
communication is always higher than in a decentralized organization, although this difference
is decreasing with the importance of coordination. This result is easily explained by noting
an informed agent, assuming that the principal makes the decision and that its preferences are only partially
aligned with those of the agent.
20Proposition 1 (in the Appendix) characterizes the relevant equilibria of the communication game.
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that the misaligment of interests between the Bank and the Fund is always greater than the
misaligment between the HQ and each single institution.
ADM prove that the limit of strategy profiles and beliefs as the number of partitions
 → ∞ is a PBE, and it is the most efficient equilibrium, that is  = ( + )
is lower than in any other equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the size of the intervals is
infinitesimally small for  close to 0 and increases at a growing rate as the module of 
increases.
4.6 The choice of governance
In this section we compare the expected losses for each governance structure. Under cen-
tralization, the HQ has got control over both the Fund and the Bank operations. Since its
objective is to minimize overall losses, the decisions it takes are always first best, conditional
on the information available. The amount of adaptation achieved depends on the impor-
tance of adaptation for the two institutions, which in turn depends on the quality of the
information released. Instead, the amount of coordination depends on the overall value of
coordination.
Let  denote the adaptation losses, that is:
 =  £(2 − 2 )2 + (1 − 1 )2¤
and let  denote the coordination losses, that is:
 = (1 − 2 )2
Expected losses under centralization are thus given by:
 =  + 2
where:
Under decentralization, the Fund and the Bank take decisions overlooking the effects of
their actions on the other’s payoff. Equilibrium decisions are thus biased with respect to
the first best even under perfect information. Moreover, strategic communication leads to
coordination failures over and above any inherent biases in equilibrium decisions.
Let  denote the adaptation losses, that is:
 = (¡1 − 1¢2 + ¡2 − 2¢2
and let  denote the coordination losses, that is:
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 =  ¡1 − 2 ¢2
Expected losses under dentralization are thus given by:
 =  + 2
ADM prove that that the adaptation losses (AL) are always higher in a centralized gov-
ernance structure, while the coordination losses (CL) are always higher in a decentralized
governance structure, that is
 − = 4 = 0∀ ∈ [0∞)
 −  = 4 ≥ 0 ∀ ∈ [0∞)
Differently from a decentralized structure, where communication is fundamental to im-
prove coordination, in a centralized structure communication is fundamental to improve
adaptation. But the misalignment of interests between the headquarter and the single insti-
tution prevents vertical communication to be truthful. This explains why adaptation losses
are always higher in a centralized governance structure than in a decentralized one. On the
other hand, in a decentralized structure, decisions are biased by the selfishness of the two
institutions, and strategic communication leads to further coordination failures. Therefore,
the coordination losses are always higher in a decentralized structure.
As the need for coordination increases, the worse performance of the centralized gover-
nance structure in terms of adaptation to local conditions is fully offset by the better results
that it can achieve under coordination. This is proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Centralization dominates decentralization for all  ≥ 019Moreover, −
 = 0 when  = 0;  − → 0 when  →∞
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition shows that a decentralized authority represents the preferred governance
structure only when the need of coordination is very low. In this case, the advantages of a
decentralized structure in achieving a better adaptation are greater than the disadvantages
of a biased decision.
In contrast, a centralized governance structure should be preferred when the coordination
need is above a given threshold level. The HQ is able to eliminate the bias arising in
decentralized equilibrium. Although the quality of adaptation remains always below of what
can be achieved under a decentralized structure, this disadvantage is fully offset by the better
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coordination results that a centralized structure can guarantee. As the need of coordination
increases further, each institution becomes more willing to coordinate with the other. Thus,
the dominant position of a centralized structure is “eroded” by the circumstance that even
in a decentralized structure the decisions become less and less biased. To the limit (as 
tends to infinity) the outcomes of the two governance structures converge to the same value.
The same result is obtained when  = 0 : in this case there is no need to balance competing
adaptation needs: the absence of conflicting preferences allows then to achieve the first best
in both types of governance structures.
5 Conclusions
Despite a series of official agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, it is
widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of what
should be rationally expected. However, a greater pressure for conformity, required by the
need of coordination, may contrast with the objective of enhancing policy adaptation to the
specific conditions revealed by each institution’s specialized expertise.
In this paper we present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of informa-
tion transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyzes the impact of different governance
structures on the trade off between responding to local conditions (i.e., improving “owner-
ship”) and the need of enhancing consistency of policy actions. We compare the performance
of a decentralized governance structure with that of a centralized one. A centralized structure
better addresses the necessity of coordinating decisions, but a greater consistency between
the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory
adaptation to “local conditions.”
Following the model of ADM, we find that a decentralized structure is to be preferred only
when the need for coordination is almost irrelevant. The better performance of the centralized
governance structure is mainly due to the selfishness nature of the two institutions: since their
reputation exclusively depends from their own performance, they systematically overlook the
impact of their actions on the other organization’s payoff. Therefore, their policy choices
will result always “too distant” with respect to the First Best. This drawback more
than offsets the better adaptation to “local conditions” that a decentralized structure can
achieve. Maintaining a decentralized structure, this result suggests that the introduction
of partial incentive alignments between the two organizations could reduce the underlying
agency problem and thus ameliorate overall outcomes.
The paper could be extended in two directions. First of all, we plan to analyze the
case of asymmetric interdependency. Indeed, as many authors have emphasized, the Fund
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seems to be less inclined to coordination than the Bank. For example, Fabricious (2007)
has argued that while the WB’ structural adjustment loans (SALs) and project lending
may await the borrower’s agreement with the Fund, the IMF’s stand by negotiations have
generally been independent from the Bank’ opinion 21 Moreover, the WB has often argued
that a structural adjustment program would fail without consistent macroeconomic policies
designed to correct external equilibrium misadjustments. Therefore, an asymmetric setting
will be more useful in order to investigate the different (relative) importance of adaptation
and coordination for the two institutions.
A further extension of our basic framework is related to the issue of the acquisition of
costly information. In the framework of coordination games based on cheap talk communi-
cation, the specialized information privately owned by agents is generally assumed to have
been costlessly collected. However, when the acquisition of specialized information is costly,
agents must balance the cost of information acquisition against its benefits. In our frame-
work the benefits are only related to the improved adaptation to “local conditions.” Thus,
it would be interesting to analyse the impact that different governance structures may have
on the agents’ incentive to invest in acquiring informative signals.
21The withholding of Fund’s credit may affect a member’s budget enough to disrupt financing for a Bank’s
supported project, but not vice versa.
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Not for Publication Appendix
Proposition 2 (Communication Equilibria). If  (0∞) then for every positive   =
1 2 there exists at least one equilibrium (1(), 2(), 1() 2(),1() 2()) where  = 
where:
(i) ( | ) is uniform supported on [−1  ] if  ∈ (−1 );
(ii) ( | ) is uniform supported on [−1 ] if  ∈ (−1 );
(iii) +1 −  =  − −1 + 4 and −(+1)− − = − − −(−1) + 4−
for  = 1 2 − 1
with  =  = 1+ under centralization and  =  = 1+ under decentralization
Proof. The proof follows directly from ADM.
Proof. Proposition 3
It is possible to show that by substituting,       for their expressions that
 − = 4+4 = 2(21 + 22) 33
3 + 322 + 3 − 2
3925 + 10784 + 11253 + 5602 + 133 + 12
Let  = 333 + 322 + 3 − 2
since the denominator of  − is always positive, it is easy to check that :
( −) =  ;  ≥ 0 ∀ ∈ [019257∞) 
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